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Many studies demonstrate that donor interest, particularly in the form of economic 
export and military-strategic interests, is an important determinant in the allocation of 
general development assistance. Does this hold true for food aid as well? This article 
analyses the allocation of food aid in the 1990s by the world’s three biggest donors as 
well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It finds some evidence for donor 
interest bias, particularly in the form of preferential treatment of geographically close 
countries. However, neither military-strategic nor export interests seem to matter. 
Former Western colonies are also not treated differently. Instead, particularly 
European Union, multilateral and NGO food aid allocation appears quite sensitive 
towards recipient countries’ needs. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is by now a long list of studies examining the allocation of general aid (see 
Neumayer [2003a] for an overview). In comparison, the allocation of food aid has been 
somewhat neglected. Partly this might be due to the fact that it represents only a small 
share of overall official development assistance (ODA), namely around 3 per cent in 
1998, down from 22 per cent in 1965 [Webb, 2000]. The peculiarities of food aid make 
an analysis of its allocation across countries worth while, however. 
The literature analysing the allocation of general aid across recipient countries in 
the wake of McKinlay and Little [1977] distinguishes between two main groups of 
determinants: donor interest and recipient need. Food aid is likely to be seen by the 
general public as more humanitarian in nature and more oriented towards recipient need 
than general ODA. We want to test whether donor interest impacts upon the allocation 
of food aid across countries and therefore distorts an allocation based on recipient need 
only. 
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The Food Aid Convention (FAC), which provides guidance for international food 
aid allocation, stresses that donors should give priority to recipient need (Art. I (b), Art. 
VII (c) and Art. VIII (b) of the FAC in its form of 1999). The perception of a 
humanitarian nature of food aid is particularly true for emergency food aid deliveries. 
Television pictures of donors handing out food aid to undernourished suffering men, 
women and children in developing countries dominate the public perception. For this 
reason, one might expect emergency food aid to be particularly strongly determined by 
recipient need. On the other hand, some observes such as Clay [2002: 204] believe that 
emergency aid is ‘intrinsically political’, which would imply that, instead, it might be 
particularly subject to donor interest. We therefore want to test whether the allocation of 
total food aid and emergency food aid in particular is free from donor interest bias. The 
share of emergency food among total food aid rose in the 1990s to a peak of 40 per cent 
in 1997 [Webb, 2000]. This development came mainly at the expense of a reduced share 
of programme food aid [Clay and Stokke, 2000]. Emergency aid consists of food to 
victims of natural and man-made disasters such as earthquakes, floods, famines, 
military conflict and the like. Programme aid is often provided to the recipient 
government or its agents where the food is sold on local markets. Yet another category, 
project aid, is provided to targeted groups for the support of specific development 
projects. 
Donors differ in the emphasis they put on donor interest versus recipient need, at 
least in their official proclamations. Historically, justification for United States (US) 
food aid has officially embraced US domestic agricultural and foreign policy interests. 
For example, the 1954 legislation establishing US food aid listed the development of 
export markets, the containment of communism and the reward to loyal allies as 
objectives of food aid in addition to humanitarian concerns [Diven, 2001: 456]. 
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However, later legislation in 1974 tried to strengthen recipient need as the major 
criterion for US food aid allocation [Zahariadis et al., 2000: 667]. In comparison, 
recipient need has been stressed as the main priority by the European Union (EU) for its 
food aid from the start [Cathie, 1997]. Art. 2 of the 1986 regulation as well as Art. 1 of 
the 1996 regulation on Food-aid Policy and Food-aid Management state as objectives of 
EU food aid the promotion of food security, raising the standard of nutrition, help in 
emergencies and the support of self-sufficiency in food production (OJ L 370/1 1986; 
OJ L 166 1996). Art. 2 of both regulations also stress that ‘food aid shall primarily be 
allocated on the basis of an objective evaluation of the real needs’ of recipient countries. 
In our test of whether donor interest biases the allocation of food aid across 
countries, we will focus on the 1990s as one would expect that the end of the Cold War 
opened the way for providing food aid to those really in need instead of those in which 
donors have economic, political and military-strategic interests. We will concentrate 
here on aid from the US, EU food aid allocated by the European Commission (EC), the 
United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).1 Table 1 shows that the first three are the world’s largest food aid donors. 
NGO food aid represents a relatively small share of world food aid, but it has not been 
analysed before and we want to see whether it is free from any donor interest bias as 
one might expect given the humanitarian mission of practically all NGOs. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
We are not addressing the issue of what determines the overall supply of food aid 
by donors. Minimum annual obligations are set by the regularly revised FAC, but 
anything going beyond that is subject to the discretion of the donor. Many studies show 
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that the overall supply is heavily influenced by domestic agricultural surpluses in donor 
countries and world prices for cereals [Gilbert, 1996; Barrett, 1998; Webb, 2000; Diven, 
2001]. We are merely interested in the allocation of aid across countries and control for 
temporary changes in the total supply of food by year-specific time dummy variables. 
The effectiveness of food aid in terms of agricultural development is also highly 
contested [Ruttan, 1993; Barrett, 1998]. This is in accordance with recent analyses 
doubting the effectiveness of general ODA, unless it is targeted to countries with good 
governance [World Bank, 1998]. A separate, but related, debate is on whether aid for 
addressing food shortages should be delivered in the form of actual food or should 
consist of financial aid for the alleviation of hunger and poverty [Reutlinger, 1999]. We 
will not engage with these discussions. Again, we are merely interested in the 
determinants of food aid allocation here, not in its effectiveness or best way of delivery. 
 
II. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Most empirical studies have focused on US food aid allocation. Eggleston [1987] finds 
that food aid allocation over the period 1955 to 1979 is influenced by both recipient 
need and US political and military interests. Shapouri and Missiaen [1990] similarly 
find for the years 1975 and 1985 that both recipient need, friendly political ideology and 
economic export interests impact upon US food aid allocation. Other than that, they find 
no major change between the two time periods. Ball and Johnson [1996] disentangle 
food aid and examine whether the allocation of different components of US food aid 
across African recipient countries have been driven by different determinants. In 
particular, they look at Title I aid, which is most explicitly tied to donor interest in the 
underlying legislation and which provides concessional credit to developing countries 
for the purchase of food, and Title II aid, which is more explicitly humanitarian and 
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often provided through the WFP. In addition, they also examine whether the 
determinants changed over time from the 1970s to the 1980s. Over the period as a 
whole and for all US food aid taken together as well as Title I aid, donor interest in the 
form of arms exports and voting similarity at the United Nations is found to be the most 
important determinant. For Title II aid, however, the donor interest variables are 
statistically insignificant and recipient need is more important than for total food aid. 
Looked at over time, Ball and Johnson [1996] find that donor interest has become less 
important in the 1980s compared to the 1970s, whereas the opposite is the case for 
recipient need. They explain this with ‘the waning influence of the Cold War’ [Ball and 
Johnson, 1996: 530], which they argue took effect from the mid-1980s onwards, that is 
long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Zahariadis et al. [2000] are the first to distinguish between two stages of US food 
aid allocation in their analysis of Title I and Title II food aid to Sub-Saharan African 
countries over the period 1978 to 1990. The general aid allocation literature had made 
this distinction much earlier already [Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Cingranelli and 
Pasquarello, 1985]. In the first stage, sometimes called gate-keeping stage, countries are 
selected as eligible or not for aid. In the second or level stage, it is determined how 
much aid goes to eligible countries. Zahariadis et al. [2000] find that donor interest in 
the form of US security concerns and trade interests plays a role in the selection of 
countries as eligible for Title I aid in addition to recipient need. In contrast, donor 
interest plays no role for the amount of Title II food aid allocated to eligible countries.2  
With respect to donors other than the US, Shapouri and Missiaen [1990] find that 
donor interest, particularly in the form of trade interests, is also a statistically significant 
determinant of Canadian and EU food aid allocation besides recipient need. Herrmann 
et al. [1992] confirm the importance of recipient need for EU food aid allocation over 
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the years 1983 to 1985. This result needs to be treated with care, however, since they do 
not control for donor interest. The same is true for a background paper to a Joint 
Evaluation of European Union Programme Food Aid undertaken by the Overseas 
Development Institute. Contrary to Herrmann et al. [1992], it found less evidence for 
the impact of recipient need on EU food aid allocation as there is ‘only a weak 
relationship between actual food aid allocations and variables approximating closely to 
indicators stated by donors as influencing their allocations. Allocations do not reflect 
direct and simple targeting according to indicators such as per capita income or balance-
of-payments problems and food availability in recipient countries’ [ODI 1996, para. 
2.5.2]. Note, however, that the latter study only examined programme food aid, whereas 
Herrmann et al. [1992] look at total food aid. 
At the aggregate level, the general aid allocation literature usually finds multilateral 
aid to be more sensitive to recipient need and less sensitive to donor interest than 
bilateral aid [Neumayer, 2003a, 2003b]. For food aid as well, there is ‘a widespread 
belief that multilateral assistance is more effective in reaching intended beneficiaries 
(…) because it is allocated more according to recipients’ needs than donors’ needs’ 
[Barrett and Heisey, 2002: 479]. Note that unlike general ODA, where there is a 
multitude of multilateral donors, almost all multilateral food aid is channelled through 
the WFP. The mission statement of the WFP postulates that it ‘will concentrate its 
efforts and resources on the neediest people and countries’ [WFP, 2003]. Surprisingly, 
however, there is only weak and somewhat ambiguous evidence that multilateral food 
aid allocation is actually more sensitive to recipient need. 
Shapouri and Missiaen [1990] find multilateral aid to be more responsive to 
recipient need in 1985 than in 1975. This result needs to be treated with care, however, 
as it derives from a model, in which recipient need variables are the only explanatory 
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variables included and donor interest is missing. A couple of other studies suffer from 
the same problem. Barrett [2001] does not directly analyse the determinants of food aid 
allocation, but he examines whether US food aid over the period 1961 to 1995 goes to 
countries with lower food availability (progressivity) and whether it stabilises short-falls 
in trend line food production over time (stabilisation). He finds neither to be the case, 
independently of whether total food aid or the components of it are looked at. Barrett 
and Heisey [2002] repeat the analysis for WFP aid over the period 1975 to 1998, 
finding evidence for both progressivity and stabilisation.3 This result is somewhat at 
odds with a study undertaken by Gabbert and Weikard [2000]. They use a complex 
formula for measuring under-nourishment as an indicator of recipient need, which is 
criticised by Barrett and Heisey [2002: 489] as being based on ‘inherently arbitrary 
assumptions about intranational food distribution’. Gabbert and Weikard [2000] find 
that Canadian and EU food aid over the period 1990 to 1996 is more targeted at 
recipient need than US or WFP aid. Japan is somewhat ambiguous as its project aid is 
strongly targeted at recipient need, whereas the opposite is true for its emergency aid. 
Emergency food aid is more targeted at recipient need than programme or project aid 
with the exception of Japan. Interesting though these results are, the failure to include 
donor interest variables means that nothing can be inferred about these and, more 
importantly, that the results could suffer from omitted variable bias if the examined 
recipient need variables are correlated with the omitted donor interest variables. A 
recent study by McGillivray [2003] stresses the importance of including both recipient 
need and donor interest variables in aid allocation models and highlights the bias in 
regression results following from a failure to do so for the case of US general ODA 
allocation. 
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Barrett and Heisey [2002: 489] explain their result that WFP food aid is both 
progressive and stabilising by saying that it ‘reflects the fact that where bilateral donors 
distribute food aid for multiple motives related to export promotion, farm surplus 
disposal, and geopolitical interests, with food security in recipient countries a decidedly 
less prominent concern, the WFP is designed to focus on the latter concern as much as 
possible’. However, one would want to test for the irrelevance of donor interest in WFP 
aid allocation as opposed to bilateral allocation, rather than assume it. Such a test is 
undertaken here. This is the first study to analyse comprehensively food aid flows in the 
1990s from the major donors explicitly testing whether the allocation of food aid is free 
from donor interest bias. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Dependent variables 
The correct accounting of what amounts to food aid is not without problems [Clay and 
Stokke 2000: 21]. Food aid can consist of food being delivered or of financial assistance 
provided that is tied to the purchase of food by the recipient (‘aid for food’). In this 
analysis, food aid means the delivery of food and is measured in tons of wheat 
equivalent. This is the only definition of food aid that can be analysed as no 
comprehensive data exist on financial aid flows for the purpose of food purchasing (‘aid 
for food’). We look at total food aid as well as one of its sub-categories, namely 
emergency aid. As mentioned above, there are arguments why emergency aid might be 
more or less biased towards donor interest than total food aid. The data come from the 
so-called INTERFAIS database and have been provided courtesy of the WFP. Note that 
in our analysis that part of US food aid, which comes under Title II of Public Law 480 
and is channelled to recipient countries via the WFP, is counted as WFP rather than US 
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food aid as it is the ultimate responsibility of the WFP to allocate these resources. Food 
aid under Title I and Title III is counted as US food aid as it is not channelled to 
recipient countries via the WFP. 
The general aid allocation literature disagrees on whether total ODA should be the 
dependent variable or ODA per capita. The latter elegantly controls for the fact that 
recipient countries differ tremendously in their population sizes. If total ODA is taken to 
be the dependent variable, then at the least population size must be one of the 
explanatory variables to account for the fact that, all other things equal, very populous 
countries are likely to receive more aid than very small ones. Which variable to choose 
should be the result of a careful consideration of the way donors are likely to allocate 
aid and should approximate their actual decision-making behaviour best. In most cases, 
it seems reasonable to presume that there is an overall fixed amount of (food) aid to be 
allocated. Given this overall constraint, McGillivray and Oczkowski [1992: 1314] are 
correct in arguing that ‘distributing aid in per capita terms in this context is both a 
difficult and cumbersome task’ as care needs to be taken neither to overshoot nor 
undershoot the fixed overall amount of money available. It is much easier for donors to 
allocate a share of the total amount of aid available to each recipient country. As 
McGillivray and Oczkowski [ibid.] point out, in this process of dividing the cake ‘aid 
decision makers may well be aware of the corresponding per capita amounts, and may 
well adjust absolute amounts on this basis, but this is taken to represent a response to 
country size. In this context, per capita aid allocations are viewed as the outcome of this 
process rather than the prime consideration.’ We therefore take the amount of food aid 
provided to a recipient country to be the dependent variable and include population size 
as a control variable (data from World Bank [2001]]. We believe that this variable 
approximates best the way donors undertake their aid allocation decisions. 
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Independent variables 
The single most common and frequently only variable of recipient need included in 
studies of general aid allocation is a country’s level of income. GDP per capita data in 
purchasing power parity were generally taken from World Bank [2001] and 
complemented by WHO [2000]. They were converted into constant US$ of 1997 with 
the help of the US GDP deflator. In addition, we include a number of variables 
capturing more specifically food aid need. The average daily per capita calorie supply in 
thousand calories is taken from UN [1997] and supplemented by FAO [2003]. An index 
of self-sufficiency is constructed from data in FAO [2003] and is defined as domestic 
cereal production divided by the sum of domestic cereal production, commercial 
imports and stock changes. Particularly for emergency aid, natural and man-made 
disasters and complex emergencies trigger a need in affected countries for food 
assistance. As one measure we include the total number of refugees in tens of thousands 
being hosted by a country with data taken from UNHCR [2002]. 
We will use a whole range of variables commonly used in the general aid 
allocation literature that cover different aspects of donor interest. First, we use a 
variable measuring the number of years a recipient country has been a colony of the 
donor between 1900 and 1960 (data from Alesina and Dollar [2000]). Former colonial 
powers usually have remaining political, economic, cultural and other interests in their 
former colonies. This variable was not included in the case of US aid allocation as the 
Philippines are the only former US colony in the sample. For aid allocation by the EU 
the variable refers to being a former colony of any EU member country. In the case of 
WFP and NGO aid, the variable counts the number of years a country has been the 
colony of any Western country. The second variable is the geographical distance 
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between the donor and the recipient country’s capital [Haveman, 2000]. Donors often 
tend to give more aid to geographically close countries in order to maintain a regional 
sphere of influence. In the case of EU aid allocation, this variable measures the distance 
to Brussels. For WFP and NGO aid, it measures the distance to either Washington D.C. 
or Brussels, whichever is smaller. Third, to see whether donors give preference to 
countries, in which they have a military-strategic interest, we include a variable 
measuring the share of United States military grants to this country (data from USAID 
[2002]). The idea behind using this variable is that countries that receive high United 
States military grants can be regarded as allied to Western donors and strategically 
important countries. Ideally, we would have liked to include similar information from 
other Western countries as well, but no sufficient data exist. Fourth, we use a variable 
measuring the amount of food exported from the donor to the recipient country as a 
share of total donor food exports (data from OECD [2002]). This variable functions as a 
proxy for the commercial food or trade interest of donors. Fifth, since we expect that it 
is in donors’ interest to give aid to “friendly” and “close” countries, we employ two 
variables trying to approximate this interest. As a proxy for converging political 
viewpoints we use a political similarity variable that draws from voting behaviour in the 
UN General Assembly (data from Gartzke, Jo and Tucker [1999]). With respect to the 
last two variables, for WFP and NGO aid we use a weighted average between the US 
and the European value. The weighting is two thirds for the US and one third for the 
European value, which approximately reflects the relative size of commitment of the US 
and the EU countries according to the Food Aid Convention. Lastly, as a proxy for 
cultural similarity we use the percentage of Protestant and Catholic people living in a 
recipient country (data from Parker [1997]). 
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As a simple test for potential problems with multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables, variance inflation factors were computed, which are well below 
three for all variables suggesting that there is no reason to be concerned about 
multicollinearity [Kennedy, 1992]. 
 
Estimation strategy 
Like Zahariadis et al. [2000] and much of the general aid allocation literature, we 
distinguish between two stages, a first eligibility or gate-keeping stage and a second 
stage, in which the amount of aid going to eligible countries is determined. There are 
basically two ways to estimate such a model. One is to follow the lead of Dudley and 
Montmarquette [1976] and many others and to treat the two stages as independent (so-
called two-part model). One of the problems with this two-part model is that it assumes 
that the errors in both stages are uncorrelated. In other words, it assumes that decisions 
at the gate-keeping stage are taken independently from the decisions at the level stage, 
which might be unrealistic. 
The second method is Heckman’s [1979] two-step estimator, which explicitly 
allows the error terms from both stages of aid allocation to be correlated. It has been 
used by, for example, McGillivray and Oczkowski [1992] in the aid allocation 
literature. One of the disadvantage of the two-step estimator is that it requires an 
exclusionary variable that has a significant impact upon the first step (gate-keeping 
stage), but not upon the second step (level stage).4 Such a variable is commonly difficult 
to find. For this reason we use the two-part model for our estimations. In non-reported 
sensitivity analysis employing Heckman’s two-step estimator without an exclusionary 
variable we found very little difference to the results reported here. We estimate the first 
stage with probit and standard errors that are robust towards arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
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and serial correlation. The second stage is estimated with a generalised estimating 
equations (GEE) random effects estimator with standard errors that in addition to 
robustness towards heteroscedasticity and serial correlation also allow observations to 
be independent across, but not necessarily within, countries (clustering). In both stages 
we also included year-specific time dummies to account for temporal changes in the 
overall amount of food aid provided. 
The explanatory variables enter the regressions with a one year lag to mimic the 
state of information that allocators of food aid have at the time of decision-making. 
Lagging these variables also fulfils the purpose of mitigating any potential simultaneity 
bias given that the amount of food aid impacts upon the calorie supply and the food 
self-sufficiency of a country. With respect to the variables measuring need for food aid, 
one could argue that due to the existence of the Global Information and Early Warning 
System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS), established in 1975 at the request of the 
1974 World Food Conference, decision makers have access to more current data. The 
same is true for national alert systems such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). However, in non-reported 
sensitivity analysis we found very little difference to the results reported below if we let 
the food recipient need variables enter the regressions without a lag. 
The sample covers the period 1990 to 1999 and in principle contains all developing 
countries and countries in transition for which data on the explanatory variables are 
available (141 in total). The dependent variable is logged in order to make its 
distribution less skewed. This also improved the model fit substantially. The population 
size, income and geographical distance explanatory variables are logged for the same 
reason. Note, however, that the results reported below are little affected if, instead, these 
variables were not logged. 
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IV. RESULTS 
We start with the US, the biggest food aid donor, for which estimation results are shown 
in table 2. At the gate-keeping stage, more populous countries as well as those with a 
lower per capita calorie supply are more likely to receive either total or emergency food 
aid. Poorer countries also have a higher chance of being eligible for total food aid. 
Contrary to expectation, countries hosting a greater number of refugees are less likely to 
receive total food aid. For both categories of aid, geographical proximity renders 
countries more likely to be eligible for aid. Countries with voting similarity in the UN 
general assembly are more likely to receive total food aid. Other biases towards donor 
interests are not apparent. With respect to the level stage, more populous, more food 
import dependent and geographically closer eligible countries receive a higher amount 
of total food aid. Neither population size, nor any of the recipient need or donor interest 
variables test statistically significantly for emergency food aid, however. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Estimation results for the EU are presented in table 3. More populous, poorer, more 
food import dependent countries as well as those with a lower per capita calorie supply 
are more likely to receive both total and emergency food aid. Countries hosting a higher 
number of refugees are more likely to receive emergency food aid, but not total food 
aid. Geographical proximity renders countries more likely to receive either total or 
emergency food aid, countries with a higher share of Protestants and Catholics are also 
more likely to receive total food aid. No other donor interest bias is apparent at the gate-
keeping stage. At the level stage, more populous and more food import dependent 
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countries as well as those with a lower per capita calorie supply receive more total and 
emergency aid. The same is true for geographically closer countries. In addition, 
countries with voting similarity in the UN general assembly receive more emergency, 
but not more total food aid. No other donor interest bias is suggested by the estimation 
results. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
The WFP’s food aid allocation is the dependent variable in the estimation results of 
table 4. More populous and poorer countries as well as those with a lower per capita 
calorie supply and those hosting more refugees are more likely to be eligible for total 
and emergency food aid. In addition, more food import dependent countries are more 
likely to receive total food aid. Donor interest does not bias the aid eligibility selection 
of emergency aid, but perhaps surprisingly countries with a higher share of Protestants 
and Catholics as well as those geographically closer to the US or Western Europe are 
more likely to receive total food aid. At the level stage, WFP total food aid is entirely 
free of donor interest bias. The same is true for emergency aid with the exception of 
voting similarity with Western countries. More populous and more food import 
dependent countries as well as those, which host a higher number of refugees, receive 
more total and emergency food aid. Poorer countries also receive more total food aid. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
Lastly, NGO donors’ food aid allocation is examined in table 5. More populous 
countries and those, which host a higher number of refugees and have a lower per capita 
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supply of calories, are more likely to receive both total and emergency food aid. A 
preference towards countries geographically closer to the US or Western Europe is 
apparent at the aid eligibility stage for both total and emergency aid. In addition, 
countries with voting patterns in the UN general assembly similar to Western countries 
are more likely to receive total food aid. At the level stage, with respect to recipient 
need it is only countries hosting more refugees that receive statistically significantly 
more aid than others. Perhaps surprisingly, countries, which receive a higher share of 
US military aid receive more food aid from NGOs. No other donor interest bias is 
apparent. These results hold for both total and emergency aid. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
It is possible to argue that for WFP and NGO food aid no influence of donor 
interest is to be expected and that the inclusion of such variables might lead to biased 
estimates for the recipient need variables due to model specification error. In non-
reported sensitivity analysis we have therefore estimated the allocation of food aid by 
these two donors again with the donor interest variables excluded. The results for the 
remaining recipient need variables are very similar to the ones reported above, 
suggesting that potential specification error does not represent a major concern here. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Is food aid allocation free from donor interest? Not quite so, as the results of the 
analysis here have shown. In particular, almost all donors give preference to countries 
that are geographically close to the donor or to the US or Western Europe in case of 
WFP and NGO aid. The geographical proximity bias need not be interpreted strictly in 
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terms of donor interest as the attempt to maintain a regional sphere of influence. The 
plight of geographically closer countries is also more salient in the public perception 
and those of policy makers. In addition, in the case of the US and the EU the 
geographical bias could also imply that these donors are willing to assume 
responsibility for their respective regions. Food aid seems to be used sometimes to 
reward political allies as measured by similar UN general assembly voting patters. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, and contrary to general ODA, food aid is not used 
to reward countries in which donors have economic export interests. In non-reported 
sensitivity analysis we checked that this holds true not only for food, but for exports of 
all other goods and services as well. Neither do donors pursue military-strategic 
interests in food aid allocation. The only exception to this is NGO aid at the level stage, 
where major recipients of US military aid also receive more NGO food aid. This result 
could be down to chance of course. Equally, no bias towards former Western colonies is 
apparent. This represents quite an important result that stands in striking contrast to the 
allocation of general ODA. Interestingly, there is no difference apparent between the US 
on the one hand and the multilateral donors WFP and EU as well as NGOs on the other 
hand. This also stands in contrast to the allocation of general ODA, for which the US 
together with France is often found to promote vigorously its own interest [Neumayer, 
2003a, 2003c]. 
One or the other aspect of recipient need impacts upon the food aid allocation of 
almost all donors at both stages and with respect to both emergency and total food aid. 
Not surprisingly, given the prominent humanitarian role of the WFP and NGOs in 
relieving food aid needs in disaster situations, we find that the number of refugees 
hosted has a statistically significant impact at both levels and for both emergency and 
total food aid of these donors. On the whole, EU food aid allocation seems to take 
18 
recipient need most comprehensively into account, whereas the opposite is the case for 
US food aid allocation. Even in the case of US food aid, however, it is only at the level 
stage of emergency aid that one or the other variable of recipient need does not test 
significantly. 
Some have suggested that WFP food aid is not well allocated with respect to 
recipient need and have explained this with the fact that the WFP gives aid to a great 
many countries. ‘The WFP has always followed a policy, as a UN agency, of the widest 
coverage with its multilateral donations of the maximum number of countries eligible to 
receive food aid, rather than concentrating its food resources in larger projects and 
programmes’ [Cathie 1997: 104]. Gabbert and Weikard [2000: 213] similarly argue that 
the widespread WFP delivery of food aid ‘is less effective, because it means that a large 
fraction of the aid goes to countries not having the most urgent needs’. However, our 
estimation results do not back this claim and instead support the opposite findings of 
Barrett and Heisey [2002] as WFP food aid allocation in the 1990s appears quite 
sensitive to recipient need throughout and at both stages. 
Population size has a positive impact upon food aid allocation almost throughout. 
At the level stage, we are not surprised to find that more populous countries receive 
more food. Given that both the dependent and the population size variables are in 
natural logs, one can interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities. With estimated 
elasticities of below one in all cases we find evidence that the well-known population 
bias of general ODA [Isenman, 1976] towards less populous countries in terms of per 
capita aid allocated carries over to food aid as well. The positive effect of population 
size at the food aid eligibility stage almost throughout is more puzzling, however. The 
bias is probably due to the higher saliency of more populous countries in the public 
mind and that of policy makers alike. It also represents some cause for concern, 
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however, as there is no reason to presume that less populous countries are any less in 
need of food aid than more populous ones. 
All in all, the fact that food aid appears to be less biased towards donors’ interests 
is to be welcomed from a normative point of view. Aid should be allocated on the basis 
of recipient need, not of donor interest. The allocation of food aid in the 1990s seems to 
comply with this requirement to a greater extent than general ODA. In particular, the 
“hard” economic export and military-strategic interests that impact upon much of the 
allocation of general ODA has no impact on the allocation of food aid. 
In future research, it might be interesting to do a similar analysis for the period 
before 1990 to compare the results from before and after the end of the cold war more 
directly. Another direction worth taking would be to simulate what the allocation 
pattern of food aid would look like if it was entirely free from donor interest bias and to 
compare the results either with actual food allocations or the ones predicted by our 
estimated models. Such an analysis would shed even more light on how important the 
impact of donor bias on food aid allocation actually is. 
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1
 European food aid is actually a mixture of aid channelled to recipient countries via the European 
Commission and national programmes. We look here at aid allocated by the Commission. Contrary to 
general ODA where the national programmes are larger than the common one, Commission food aid is 
much larger than national European food aid programmes. 
2
 They do not estimate a stage two model for Title I aid as there are too few eligible countries and do not 
estimate a stage one model for Title II aid as almost all countries receive some Title II aid. This is a 
consequence of their decision to restrict the sample to Sub-Saharan African countries. 
3
 Progressivity only holds if no region-specific dummy variables are included in the estimations. 
4
 Strictly speaking, no exclusionary variable is required, but in its absence the validity of estimations 
depends on restrictive distributional assumptions only [Breen, 1996]. 
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Table 1. FOOD AID IN THE 1990s. 
 
Total food aid 
Donor Quantity % of world food aid 
EU 14700 12.28 
NGO 1251 1.05 
US 45300 37.85 
WFP 32300 26.99 
Total 119687  
   
Emergency food aid 
Donor Quantity % of world food aid 
EU 3557 9.52 
NGO 908 2.43 
US 5092 13.63 
WFP 22200 59.44 
Total 37347  
 
Note: Quantity in thousand tons of wheat equivalent. 
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TABLE 2. US FOOD AID ALLOCATION. 
 
 Total Emergency 
 1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
ln Population 0.077 0.420 0.022 0.329 
 (6.36)** (1.99)* (4.43)** (1.30) 
ln GDP p.c. -0.195 0.294 0.004 -0.064 
 (6.63)** (1.08) (0.32) (0.18) 
Calorie supply -0.139 -0.139 -0.119 -0.833 
 (2.46)* (0.36) (4.17)** (1.52) 
Food self-sufficiency 0.066 -1.011 0.011 -0.906 
 (1.14) (2.39)* (0.41) (1.61) 
# Refugees -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.004 
 (2.25)* (0.61) (1.08) (0.27) 
US military aid -0.018 -0.008 -0.067 -0.214 
 (1.63) (0.47) (3.96)** (0.39) 
Share Food exports -1.19 4.776 -1.228 41.242 
 (0.72) (0.27) (1.09) (1.60) 
UN vote-similarity 0.366 0.154 -0.037 -0.153 
 (5.25)** (0.31) (2.39)* (0.18) 
Distance -0.331 -0.883 -0.028 0.434 
 (9.09)** (2.39)* (2.63)** (1.07) 
% Protestant/Catholic -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (3.85)** (1.58) (6.42)** (0.16) 
Pseudo R2 .21  .16  
r2 (predicted/actual)  .15  .27 
Observations 1330 545 1330 183 
Countries 141 90 141 52 
 
Note: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Coefficients of constant and year specific 
dummies not reported. The goodness of fit measure for the 2nd stage estimation is the 
squared correlation coefficient between predicted and actual levels of food aid.  
* statistically significant at 95% level  ** at 99% level 
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TABLE 3. EU FOOD AID ALLOCATION. 
 
 Total Emergency 
 1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
ln Population 0.073 0.534 0.055 0.562 
 (5.55)** (4.97)** (5.78)** (3.68)** 
ln GDP p.c. -0.307 -0.559 -0.096 -0.303 
 (8.57)** (1.70) (4.14)** (0.69) 
Calorie supply -0.238 -1.624 -0.230 -1.923 
 (3.79)** (3.19)** (5.09)** (2.90)** 
Food self-sufficiency -0.170 -1.426 -0.231 -1.670 
 (2.46)* (3.21)** (4.52)** (2.78)** 
# Refugees -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 
 (0.11) (0.43) (2.02)* (1.66) 
US military aid -0.005 -0.045 -0.003 -0.119 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.52) (1.34) 
Share Food exports 2.725 -2.015 0.740 -12.636 
 (1.86) (0.25) (0.70) (1.26) 
Colony -0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.30) (3.00)** (0.93) (0.49) 
UN vote-similarity -0.349 1.004 -0.326 2.881 
 (2.32)* (0.88) (3.14)** (1.97)* 
Distance -0.210 -1.999 -0.186 -1.395 
 (5.81)** (4.93)** (7.23)** (3.11)** 
% Protestant/Catholic 0.003 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 
 (5.23)** (1.39) (0.65) (0.11) 
Pseudo R2 .30  .22  
r2 (predicted/actual)  .23  .18 
Observations 1337 616 1337 322 
Countries 141 106 141 79 
 
Note: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Coefficients of constant and year specific 
dummies not reported. The goodness of fit measure for the 2nd stage estimation is the 
squared correlation coefficient between predicted and actual levels of food aid.  
* statistically significant at 95% level  ** at 99% level 
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TABLE 4. WFP FOOD AID ALLOCATION. 
 
 Total Emergency 
 1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
ln Population 0.070 0.497 0.056 0.479 
 (5.37)** (5.76)** (4.13)** (2.79)** 
ln GDP p.c. -0.308 -0.596 -0.156 -0.473 
 (9.91)** (2.49)* (5.15)** (1.36) 
Calorie supply -0.161 -0.102 -0.302 -0.426 
 (3.27)** (0.35) (5.07)** (0.95) 
Food self-sufficiency -0.202 -0.868 -0.056 -1.730 
 (3.57)** (2.18)* (0.97) (3.41)** 
# Refugees 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.012 
 (4.86)** (3.43)** (4.92)** (3.20)** 
US military aid 0.006 -0.022 -0.004 -0.054 
 (1.42) (0.80) (0.57) (1.38) 
Share Food exports -0.316 -2.752 2.712 -3.662 
 (0.21) (0.15) (1.32) (0.20) 
Colony 0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.001 
 (1.53) (1.35) (0.62) (0.16) 
UN vote-similarity -0.319 0.940 -0.262 1.703 
 (3.65)** (1.49) (2.58)** (1.96)* 
Distance -0.113 -0.026 -0.031 0.269 
 (4.53)** (0.08) (1.06) (0.54) 
% Protestant/Catholic 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (3.09)** (0.15) (3.73)** (1.05) 
Pseudo R2 .41  .31  
r2 (predicted/actual)  .32  .18 
Observations 1330 822 1330 471 
Countries 141 105 141 90 
 
Note: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Coefficients of constant and year specific 
dummies not reported. The goodness of fit measure for the 2nd stage estimation is the 
squared correlation coefficient between predicted and actual levels of food aid.  
* statistically significant at 95% level  ** at 99% level 
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TABLE 5. NGO FOOD AID ALLOCATION. 
 
 Total Emergency 
 1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
1st stage 
(Probit) 
2nd stage 
(GEE) 
ln Population 0.046 0.056 0.035 0.056 
 (5.57)** (0.49) (4.89)** (0.48) 
ln GDP p.c. -0.019 -0.580 -0.014 -0.569 
 (0.95) (1.46) (0.81) (1.36) 
Calorie supply -0.310 -0.640 -0.251 -0.161 
 (7.65)** (1.09) (6.81)** (0.28) 
Food self-sufficiency -0.072 -1.120 -0.059 -0.602 
 (1.82) (1.80) (1.67) (1.06) 
# Refugees 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.009 
 (2.49)* (3.70)** (2.77)** (3.79)** 
US military aid -0.002 0.055 -0.003 0.041 
 (0.36) (2.49)* (0.48) (2.25)* 
Share Food exports 1.452 16.559 1.806 14.074 
 (1.28) (1.23) (1.83) (1.11) 
Colony 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 
 (0.28) (0.57) (0.45) (0.71) 
UN vote-similarity 0.127 -1.057 0.095 -1.126 
 (2.05)* (1.04) (1.72) (1.20) 
Distance -0.123 -0.719 -0.093 -0.519 
 (6.34)** (1.55) (5.29)** (1.10) 
% Protestant/Catholic -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.38) (0.18) (3.41)** (0.03) 
Pseudo R2 .22  .22  
r2 (predicted/actual)  .19  .18 
Observations 1330 243 1330 206 
Countries 141 68 141 64 
 
Note: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Coefficients of constant and year specific 
dummies not reported. The goodness of fit measure for the 2nd stage estimation is the 
squared correlation coefficient between predicted and actual levels of food aid.  
* statistically significant at 95% level  ** at 99% level 
 
